CASE COMMENTARIES
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a
licensee’s ability to retain intellectual property rights under 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(n) does not extend to the licensee’s exclusive distribution
rights or trademark licenses. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology,
LLC (In re Tempnology, LLC), 879 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2018).
Duncan Bryant
In Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, the First Circuit
addressed whether a licensee can retain exclusive distribution rights and
trademark licenses after the licensor has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
According to 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), a company that is undergoing a Chapter
11 bankruptcy proceeding may, with court approval, reject any executory
contract that the debtor-in-possession deems would hinder its ability to
restructure. However, there is an exception — when the rejected contract
is one ‘“under which the debtor is a licensor of a right to intellectual
property,’ the licensee may elect to ‘retain its rights to such intellectual
property.”’ 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1). Upon review, the First Circuit held that
these rights of retainer do not encompass either exclusive distribution
rights or trademark licenses.
On November 21, 2012, Tempnology, LLC (“Debtor”) executed
a Co-Marketing and Distribution agreement with Mission Product
Holdings, Inc. (“Mission”). The agreement provided Mission with (1)
both exclusive and nonexclusive rights to several of Debtor’s products; (2)
a nonexclusive, perpetual license to Debtor’s intellectual property,
excluding trademarks; and (3) a nonexclusive, non-transferable license to
use its trademark and logo “for the limited purpose of performing its
obligations” under the agreement. Mission was also required to “comply
with any written trademark guidelines,” and Debtor retained the right to
review all trademark usage.
On June 30, 2014, Mission exercised an option to terminate the
agreement without cause. The termination option triggered a “WindDown Period,” which would allow Mission to retain its distribution and
145
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trademark rights until July 1, 2016. On September 1, 2015, however,
Debtor filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Debtor then
filed a motion in the bankruptcy court to reject several of its active
contracts, including its agreement with Mission, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
365(a). Debtor informed the bankruptcy court that the agreement’s grant
of exclusive distribution rights to Mission hindered Debtor’s ability to
“derive revenue from other marketing and distribution opportunities.”
Specifically, Debtor blamed Mission for its bankruptcy. Mission objected
under the theory that 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) allowed Mission to retain its
distribution rights and intellectual property licenses.
The bankruptcy court ultimately granted Debtor’s rejection and
held that Mission’s exclusive distribution rights and limited trademark
licenses could not be retained. The court stated that distribution rights
“could not fairly be characterized as [intellectual property].” As such, it
was not an exception to the broad rejection authority granted under 11
U.S.C. § 365(n). Moreover, the court reasoned that Congress’s omission
of trademarks from the definition of intellectual property found in 11
U.S.C. § 101(35A) was intended to purposely exclude them from the same
kind of protection under 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).
Mission then appealed to the First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel (“BAP”). The BAP agreed with the bankruptcy court’s assessment
of the distribution rights but disagreed with its holding as to the trademark
licenses. Instead, the BAP followed the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in
Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, 686 F.3d 372
(7th Cir. 2012), and held that the rejection of the contract between Debtor
and Mission, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(g), only relieved Debtor of its
contractual obligations but did not necessarily extinguish Mission’s rights.
Debtor then appealed to the First Circuit.
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted that this was
an issue of first impression. Ultimately, the First Circuit agreed with the
bankruptcy court and held that Mission’s exclusive distribution rights and
trademark licenses were not able to be retained under 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).
First, the court defined the scope of the Debtor’s rights to reject or assume
executory contracts under 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). The court stated that 11
U.S.C. § 365(a) was created to further the objective of a Chapter 11
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bankruptcy by permitting debtors-in-possession to assume contracts that
are beneficial to them and reject those that hinder their business. After
rejecting the contract, the debtor is left with a liability that is deemed to be
a pre-petition breach of contract pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
Next, the court looked to the legislative history of 11 U.S.C. §
365(n) and noted that Congress had explicitly enacted this section “to
make clear that the rights of an intellectual property licensee to use the
licensed property cannot be unilaterally cut off.” The court, referencing
the congressional report, also stated that Congress did not mention the
protection of exclusive rights other than those to intellectual property.
Thus, Mission would only be able to enforce exclusivity provisions insofar
as they related to intellectual property rights.
The court also rejected Mission’s argument that its right to
exclusively distribute several of Debtor’s products resulted in a de facto
exclusive right to the intellectual property. Here, the court noted that the
very language of the agreement between Debtor and Mission made it clear
that “Debtor can use its intellectual property to make and sell products
other than those for which the [a]greement grants Mission exclusive
distribution rights.” Furthermore, the court observed that “[a]n exclusive
right to sell a product is not equivalent to an exclusive right to exploit the
product’s underlying intellectual property.” Mission also tried to argue
that, because of its distribution rights, no one could use the underlying
patent to sell the exclusive products. The court found this argument
immaterial, as Mission would retain its distribution rights regardless of
whether the patent was used. To hold otherwise, said the court, “would
be to find buried in a parenthetical . . . an implied exception that would . .
. likely cover as much commercial territory as do some of the rights
expressly defined as protected.”
The First Circuit also rejected Mission’s argument that its
nonexclusive licenses would be of little value without the exclusive
licenses. The court noted that there were several ways that Mission could
continue to use its nonexclusive licenses in profitable manners, including
sublicenses, use, reproduction, modifications, or derivative work based on
Debtor’s intellectual property. “And if those rights lacked meaningful
value,” the court noted, “that hardly becomes a reason for turning rights
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that are not intellectual property rights into intellectual property rights.
Rather, it simply suggests that most of the contract's value was apparently
in the exclusive distribution agreement.” Thus, the First Circuit held that
Mission’s exclusive distribution rights were in no way retainable under 11
U.S.C. § 365(n).
The court also held that Mission’s limited trademark licenses were
not protected. The court noted that when Congress defined what types
of intellectual property were protected under 11 U.S.C. § 365(n), the
statute listed six different variants. The court observed that no references
to trademarks were included in the statute. Furthermore, the Senate report
on 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) stated that any decision on protecting trademark
licenses were “postpone[d] . . . to allow the development of equitable
treatment . . . by bankruptcy courts.” S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5. Therefore,
the plain language of the statute and legislative history made it clear that a
licensee cannot retain trademarks.
The First Circuit also addressed the reasoning of the Seventh
Circuit in Sunbeam, which held that although a rejection of a contract “frees
the estate from the obligation to perform[,] . . . nothing about this process
implies that any rights of the other contracting party has been vaporized.”
Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377. However, the First Circuit observed that
“rejection as Congress viewed it does not ‘vaporize’ a right. Rather, the
rejection converts the right into a pre-petition claim for damages.” There
is already a statutory provision that would preserve Mission’s ability to
recover damages for the loss of Mission’s trademark licenses. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(g). No rights would be “vaporized” by not allowing Mission to
retain its trademark licenses.
Furthermore, the court held that allowing Mission to retain its
trademark licenses would be antithetical to the purpose of contract
rejection. The primary purpose of allowing a company in bankruptcy to
reject executory contracts is “to release the debtor’s estate from
burdensome obligations that can impede a successful reorganization.”
However, if a company was forced to license trademarks, those licenses
would necessarily require constant monitoring. Failure to do so would
potentially result in the original licensor’s loss of its trademark rights,
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which, the court noted, would hardly be conducive to a successful
restructuring.
In an opinion that concurred in part and dissented in part, Judge
Torruella disagreed with the First Circuit’s holding that Mission’s
trademark licenses were not protected. He instead preferred the Senate
report’s calling for “equitable treatment,” and proposed a case-by-case
analysis as opposed to a bright-line rule. However, the majority noted that
bankruptcy proceedings are often costly and unpredictable. Moreover, it
is almost always impossible to determine how burdensome continuing
licenses may be until the licensee’s subsequent actions are performed.
Thus, it was better to establish a rule that would reduce future costs and
litigation.
Ultimately, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the bankruptcy court and allowed Debtor to summarily reject the
agreement without being forced to continue licensing its trademarks. The
court indicated that “we favor the categorical approach . . . unless and until
Congress should decide otherwise.”
The First Circuit’s ruling in this case creates a circuit split on this
issue. On October 26, 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. They
will decide “[w]hether, under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtorlicensor’s ‘rejection’ of a license agreement — which ‘constitutes a breach
of such contract,’ 11 U.S.C. §365(g) — terminates rights of the licensee
that would survive the licensor’s breach under applicable non- bankruptcy
law.” The International Trademark Association has filed brief amicus
curiae in favor of adopting the Sunbeam rule, claiming that it “promotes
the strength and stability of the trademark system.” A group of law
professors have done the same, arguing that a ruling in line with Sunbeam
will “increase commercial certainty” and “protect the legitimate
expectations of debtors and non-debtors alike.” Oral argument in this
case has yet to be set, but attorneys should have a clear answer as to how
Section 11 filings impact pre-existing intellectual property licenses soon.
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REAL ESTATE
The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that in the dispersal of
proceeds from the sale of joint property, absent an agreement to the
contrary, a cotenant of real property is entitled to proportional
contribution from other cotenants when the cotenant has paid more
than her portion toward liens, taxes, and other encumbrances. Talley
v. Paisley, 525 S.W.3d 523 (Ky. 2017).
Tanner Hamilton
In Talley v. Paisley, 525 S.W.3d 523 (Ky. 2017), the Supreme Court
of Kentucky considered whether joint partners of a property should divide
the proceeds of sale solely on the basis of ownership, rather than also
considering the respective contributions of each partner. The court
ultimately held that a joint tenant is entitled to recover a contribution for
payments made towards the property on a cotenant’s behalf.
Consequently, the proceeds of sale should be used first to equalize the
amount of expenses paid and then divided based on percentages of
ownership.
This case arose out of the sale of jointly held property in
Lexington, Kentucky. In 2004, Anne Talley (“Talley”) and Daniel Paisley
(“Paisley”) purchased a tract of land to construct a residential home.
Because Talley was legally married to another person, the parties placed
the property solely in Paisley’s name. In October 2006, after Talley
finalized her divorce, the parties placed the property in their joint names
with a right of survivorship. At that point, Talley had contributed
$120,000 for the down payment of the land, and Paisley had allegedly
contributed $109,942 for construction and loan costs. In November 2006,
the parties acquired two mortgage loans secured by the property for
$225,000 and $250,000, respectively. Both Talley and Paisley were comortgagors and co-makers on the notes. However, Paisley and Talley
failed to execute an agreement regarding the disposition of the property if
the joint tenancy relationship was to end.
After the creation of their joint tenancy relationship, Paisley began
making all payments associated with the property. In July 2007, Paisley
paid $200,000 towards the $250,000 mortgage and then paid off the
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balance in December 2009. In addition, Paisley paid $19,119 towards the
$225,000 mortgage and $3,052 to close a construction loan. Further, from
2007 to March 2014, Paisley made all of the mortgage payments in full.
Paisley stated that he never demanded payment from Talley because he
believed Talley would pay him back after she received her $350,000
divorce settlement. In January 2013, Paisley moved out of the property
and his relationship with Talley ended, but Paisley continued making
mortgage and insurance payments.
Several months later, Paisley brought an action under KRS §
389A.030 requesting the sale of the property and dispersal of all equity
based on each party’s respective contribution. The property eventually
sold for $715,000, resulting in $477,397 of equity. “Paisley proposed that
these proceeds be divided based on the parties’ proportionate
contribution and to reflect the fact that he had contributed more to the
residence.” His calculations showed that Talley had contributed $120,000,
and he had contributed $383,921. Consequently, Paisley asserted that
Talley should only receive $105,500 from the proceeds and he should
receive the remaining $369,500.
Following a bench trial, the court rejected Paisley’s request to
disburse the proceeds based on contribution. Instead, the court held that
the proceeds should be equally divided. The court also emphasized that,
had Talley and Paisley specified in an agreement regarding disposition of
the property, the court would have been required to consider both parties’
contribution. Paisley appealed the trial court’s decision.
On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals maintained the trial
court’s finding that there was no contract regarding division but reversed
the holding that Paisley was not entitled to proportional reimbursement.
Specifically, the court stated that, as a matter of law, Paisley was entitled
to proportional reimbursement for payments made during the joint
tenancy, despite the absence of a contract mandating such division. In
response, Talley petitioned for discretionary review, and the Kentucky
Supreme Court granted her petition.
Talley argued that there is a presumption that property held in
joint tenancy is to be held equally and, therefore, equal division of sales
proceeds is appropriate. She further claimed that even “if Paisley could
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rebut the presumption of equality by clear and convincing evidence, he
waived any right to contribution or intended his contributions to Talley
to be a gift.”
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the appellate court’s
decision, holding that “to the extent one tenant contributed more than his
or her half to the discharge of encumbrances, liens, [and] taxes, that tenant
is entitled to contribution from the other.” In making its determination,
the court considered its decision in Larmon v. Larmon, 191 S.W. 110 (Ky.
1917), where the court established the general rule that a joint tenant is
entitled to reimbursement from his cotenant for liens and encumbrances,
including mortgages and taxes. The court also revisited its decision in Petty
v. Petty, 295 S.W. 863, (Ky. 1927), where it clarified this rule of recovery.
Finally, the court briefly discussed its decision in Bishop v. Wolford,
291 S.W. 1049 (Ky. 1927), which recognized that a contract is not a
prerequisite to recovery. The court further explained that “[e]quitable
contribution[s] between co-tenants of undivided interests in real estate has
often been recognized and enforced, even without a contract between the
parties to that effect.” The court acknowledged that the record did not
reflect that Paisley intended to waive any rights to contribution or intend
his contributions to be gifts. The court simply attributed the absence of
an agreement between Talley and Paisley to a failure of the parties to
anticipate the ending of their relationship. Ultimately, the Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed the Kentucky Court of Appeals’ decision and
remanded the case to the Fayette Circuit Court with instructions to award
Paisley an amount “which will equalize [his] respective contribution.”
After such an amount is determined and distributed, the court provided
that the remaining proceeds shall be split equally.
Justice Keller dissented stating that, under property law, the
proceeds should have been divided based exclusively on equity. In
addition, he stated that such a holding misattributed family law principles
into the joint tenant relationship.
Overall, Talley seems to indicate that, absent an actual agreement,
courts will likely find an implied contract between joint tenants that
requires them to equally assume expenses. This may be contrary to the
original intentions of the parties, but courts are reluctant to equally divide
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proceeds of a sale, when dealing with joint tenants, if one cotenant
contributed more than the other. Practitioners should be aware that this
ruling differs from common law principles of joint tenancy, where both
parties to the relationship are treated as owning equal shares of the
property. As such, practitioners should ensure that agreements among
parties are documented and stipulate the disposition of the property in the
event that the joint tenancy is terminated. Moreover, if a joint tenant
agrees to pay all of the expenses when the joint tenancy is created, only a
binding contract will preclude the joint tenant from proportionate
recovery if she changes her mind.
SECURITIES
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’s whistleblower
protection provision only protects individuals who have reported the
alleged violation to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Dig.
Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S.Ct. 767 (2018).
Drew Hove
In Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, the Supreme Court addressed
whether the anti-retaliation provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Act” or “Dodd-Frank”)
extends to individuals who have not reported the violation to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”). The
Act was created to shield whistleblowers from retaliatory action by their
employers. A whistleblower is, “any individual who provides . . .
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission
. . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). The anti-retaliation provision also offers
protection to individuals who were terminated or otherwise retaliated
against after making required disclosures under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”), or any other law subject to the jurisdiction of
the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). Through a careful reading of the
whistleblower definition, comparisons between Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank, and an analysis of the Act’s Senate report, the Supreme
Court concluded that Dodd-Frank’s definition of a “whistleblower” also
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applies to individuals making disclosures otherwise required by law, such
as those made with respect to Sarbanes-Oxley.
This dispute arose from Digital Realty Trust, Inc.’s (“Digital
Realty”) employment of Paul Somers (“Somers”), as the Vice President
from 2010 to 2014. Digital Realty, a real estate investment trust, allegedly
terminated Somers after he reported his suspicion of securities law
violations to senior management. Months after his discharge, Somers filed
suit in the Northern District of California alleging whistleblower
retaliation under Dodd-Frank, which provides a generous statute of
limitations period of six years. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii). Somers did
not file an administrative complaint within 180 days of his termination to
qualify for recovery under Sarbanes-Oxley, which extends its antiretaliation protections more broadly. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (2002).
Digital Realty moved to dismiss the claim, asserting that Somers was not
eligible for Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protection because he did not
report the securities law violations to the SEC prior to his termination.
The district court denied Digital Realty’s motion to dismiss, stating that
reporting alleged violations to the SEC is not a requirement to obtain
whistleblower status under the Act.
On interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Act should protect all employees, regardless
of whether they reported the violation to the Commission. The court
acknowledged that the Act defines “whistleblower” as an individual who
reports information to the SEC, but ultimately decided that applying the
definition to the entire Act would require making disclosures as required
or protected under “any other law, rule, or regulation” in addition to
reporting the violation to the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)–(h)(1)(A)(iii).
Furthermore, “such dual reporting,” the majority believed, “was unlikely
to occur.” Therefore, the majority concluded, “the statute should be read
to protect employees who make disclosures privileged by clause (iii) of §
78u–6(h)(1)(A), whether or not those employees also provide information
to the SEC.” The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this issue,
because both the Second and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals had
established conflicting opinions of the SEC reporting requirement under
Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy L.L.C.,
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801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding for an independent reading of
Dodd-Frank’s definition of “whistleblower” and anti-retaliation
provision); Asadi v. G.E. Energy, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013)
(holding for a dependent reading).
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the Act’s anti-retaliation
provision applied only to individuals who have reported the securities
violation to the SEC. The Court began by reviewing the meaning of
“whistleblower” in Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision. The Court
acknowledged that “whistleblower” is defined in the definition section of
the Act, and directly instructs that the definition apply throughout the antiretaliation provision.
The Court also recognized that “another
whistleblower-protection provision of Dodd-Frank imposes no
requirement that information be conveyed to a government agency.”
Thus, the Court could only reason that Congress intentionally placed the
reporting requirement in the anti-retaliation provision.
Next, the Court described how this reasoning corroborates with
the purposes of both Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley. The Court stated
that Dodd-Frank was enacted amidst the 2008 financial crisis “to motivate
people who know of securities law violations to tell the SEC.” S. REP.
NO. 111-176, at 38. While Sarbanes-Oxley’s underlying intention was to
“disturb the ‘corporate code of silence’ that ‘discouraged employees from
reporting fraudulent behavior not only to the proper authorities, . . . but
even internally.’” Lawson v. FMR L.L.C., 571 U.S. 429, 435 (2014). Thus,
both statutes were designed to protect individuals who report violations
to the Commission.
The Court then acknowledged that Dodd-Frank, under 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(a)(6)–(h)(1)(A)(iii), offers protection only after reporting to the
Commission, while Sarbanes-Oxley, under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C),
offers remedy without disclosure to any agency. Dodd-Frank permits
compensation for retaliation in twice the amount of back pay, plus interest,
in addition to ten to thirty percent of the monetary sanctions, pursuant to
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii), while Sarbanes Oxley simply allows
compensation for back pay with interest, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1514A(c)(2)(B). Thus, “Dodd-Frank’s award program and anti-retaliation
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provision . . . work synchronously to motivate individuals with knowledge
to ‘tell the SEC.’”
After a thorough reading of the Act, the Court held that the
“whistleblower” definition shall apply throughout. Furthermore, the Act’s
definition of whistleblower operates in tandem with the three provisions
providing protection for whistleblowers by ensuring protection only to
those employees who have also reported the alleged violations to the SEC.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). The Court also noted that the Act’s
increased awards signify Congress’s intentions to provide compensation
for employees abiding by Dodd-Frank’s stringent requirements.
Lastly, the Supreme Court briefly responded to Somers’s
contention that auditors, attorneys, and other employees who are subject
to internal-reporting requirements would be at risk with a dependent
holding that requires SEC reporting. The Court acknowledged that
Sarbanes-Oxley does require auditors and attorneys to report claims
internally before making any external reports. However, the Court
reiterated that the professionals will be protected under Dodd-Frank from
any retaliatory actions by their employer if they also provide relevant
information to the Commission.
Moreover, Somers argued that the third clause, allowing protection
for employees after making required disclosures under any law subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission, would be undermined by having to
report to the SEC in addition to any federal agency, internal supervisor, or
the like. However, the Court saw Dodd-Frank’s power conveyed most
accurately when requiring a disclosure to the Commission, because
Congress’s intentions when writing the Act into law was to increase the
number of securities law violations reported to the Commission.
Justice Thomas and Justice Sotomayor offered concurring
opinions providing their thoughts of the majority’s reliance on DoddFrank’s Senate report. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38. Justice Thomas
thought the proper holding of this case lies strictly in the “whistleblower”
definition, without further consideration of the Senate report. In rebuttal,
Justice Sotomayor stated the best way to ensure fidelity to Congress’s
intent is to analyze the report used to enact the law itself.
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In conclusion, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed
the District Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holdings that
Dodd-Frank does not require a report to the Commission for
whistleblower protection and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with this requirement. The Supreme Court indicated that the
statute’s definition of “whistleblower” is clear and conclusive, and
“unambiguous . . ., in short, [and] precludes the Commission from more
expansively interpreting that term.”
In light of this decision, to secure general employees, auditors,
attorneys, and like professionals’ proper anti-retaliation protection,
practitioners should ensure that the concerned employee has immediately
reported the alleged securities law violations to the Commission for DoddFrank protection. Further, to be certain the employee will be afforded
protection, the practitioner should ensure that they have filed an
administrative complaint within 180 days for Sarbanes-Oxley protection.
Because of the Dodd-Frank’s strict “whistleblower” definition, the
Supreme Court cannot permit an expansive reading to offer help to a
would-be worthy recipient who fails to report their claims to the
Commission — effectively leaving some wrongfully terminated employees
vulnerable.
STATE AND LOCAL TAX
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–
901, rather than § 67–1–1801, applies in a suit to recover municipal
taxes, and under § 67–1–901(a) the plaintiff is required to pay a
disputed municipality tax under protest to be eligible for a refund.
Chuck’s Package Store v. City of Morristown, 545 S.W.3d 398 (Tenn. 2018).
Madeline Leonard
In Chuck’s Package Store v. City of Morristown, the Tennessee Supreme
Court determined whether a plaintiff is eligible for a refund of disputed
municipality taxes, whenever the plaintiff did not previously pay the tax
under protest. To answer this question, the Tennessee Supreme Court
addressed whether Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-1-901, et. seq., or §§ 67-1-1801,
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et. seq., govern municipality tax disputes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–901(a)
requires that taxpayers pay a disputed tax under protest to qualify for
refunds, while Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–1807(b), on the other hand,
eradicates the payment-under-protest requirement for taxes paid after
January 1, 1986.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 57–3–501(a)(1) authorizes municipalities to
impose an inspection fee on local, licensed alcoholic beverage retailers.
The fee is limited, however, to a maximum percentage based on the
municipality’s population, as calculated by the latest federal census.
Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57–3–501(b), municipalities with fewer
than 60,000 residents may charge no more than “eight percent of the
wholesale price of the alcoholic beverages” supplied in the municipality.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 57–3–501(c), on the other hand, provides that
municipalities with populations exceeding 60,000 may charge no more
than five percent of the wholesale price. The City of Morristown in
Hamblen County (the “City”) adopted an ordinance imposing an
inspection fee of eight percent based on the county’s previous population
of less than 60,000. However, “[b]y January 2011, the county’s population,
according to the 2010 federal census, increased to over 60,000.” Although
the City should have decreased its fee to five percent, based on the
ordinance, the City continued to collect eight percent from alcoholic
beverage retailers from 2011 to 2014.
In June 2014, Chuck’s Package Store, an alcoholic beverage
retailer, notified the City that it was overcharging inspection fees based on
the population increase. Although the City’s administrative services
director initially acknowledged the error and promised to refund the
overpayments, the director later informed Chuck’s Package Store it would
not issue a refund. In October 2014, multiple alcoholic beverage retailers
filed suit against the City for excessive collections, seeking reimbursement
and additional damages. The City moved to dismiss the claims, arguing
that the retailers did not pay the disputed taxed under protest as required
by Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-1-901(a) and 67-1-911. The trial court denied
the city’s motion, holding that Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67–1–1801, et. seq.,
applied to municipality tax disputes and did not require the alcoholic
beverage retailers to pay under protest before seeking a refund. After a
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bench trial, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs $452,120.51 as
reimbursement for the excessive collections.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding
that Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–1807 applied to all taxes paid or issued after
January 1, 1986. “The [c]ourt of [a]ppeals construed [§] 67-1-1807 to
remove the requirement for payment under protest for all taxes paid after
January 1, 1986, with that statute controlling and superseding all
conflicting laws.” Because the court of appeals had previously issued
conflicting decisions regarding disputed municipality taxes, the Tennessee
Supreme Court granted the City’s application to appeal to establish
uniformity.
The supreme court first focused on the plain language of the
statutes at issue to determine the legislature’s intent. Tenn. Code. Ann. §
67–1–901(a) “requires a taxpayer, before seeking a refund, to pay under
protest any disputed state taxes.” This provision, along with others, was
expanded by the General Assembly in 1959 to ensure that all sections
included municipal tax disputes. In 1986, the legislature created an
exception to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-901 in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–
901(b), which states, “This section shall not apply to any tax collected or
administered by the commissioner of revenue when such tax is paid on or
after January 1, 1986.” At the same time, the legislature also added Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 67–1–1801, et. seq., to the state code. Tenn. Code Ann. §
67–1–1801(a) outlines a taxpayer’s options for remedy whenever “taxes
that are collected or administered by the commissioner of the revenue”
are deemed “unjust, illegal, or incorrect.” Furthermore, Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 67–1–1807 eliminated the payment under protest requirement “for the
recovery of taxes as set out in [that] part.” Finally, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–
1–1807(c) established that “[t]o the extent that this section conflicts with
any other law, this section shall control and supersede all such laws.”
Therefore, the 1986 additions to the code permits taxpayers to forgo the
payment-under-protest requirement whenever the disputed taxes are
“collected or administered by the commissioner of revenue.”
Next, the supreme court discussed prior appellate decisions that
resulted in conflicting decisions. In Lebanon Liquors v. City of Lebanon, 885
S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), a group of liquor retailers sued the City
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of Lebanon after a population increase led to an excessive collection of
inspection fees. In that case, the court of appeals held that Tenn. Code
Ann. §§ 67–1–901, et. seq., governed municipal taxes because the limitation
in § 67–1–901(b) applied only to “taxes collected by the commissioner of
revenue.”
In another case, Decactur Cty. v. Vulcan Materials Co., No. W200100858-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31786985 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), the court
of appeals held that Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67–1–1801, et. seq., governed
municipal tax disputes. The court cited no previous case law, but instead
relied heavily on the plain language of the statute. Because the statute’s
language was “quite broad,” the court reasoned that Tenn. Code Ann. §
67–1–1807 eliminates the requirement for a taxpayer to pay under protest
before recovering refunds.
The supreme court held that following the legislative changes
made in 1986, municipal taxes and state taxes have different requirements
for recovery under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67–1–901, et seq., and §§ 67–1–
1801, et. seq., respectively. The 1986 revision to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–
901(b) and §§ 67–1–1801, et. seq., eliminated the payment under protest
requirement for taxes collected by the commissioner of revenue only.
None of the added provisions addressed municipal taxes. Therefore, the
court “cannot add ‘municipal taxes’ to these statutes to expand their
scope.” Moreover, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–1807(a) limits its own
applicability to “taxes as set out in this part,” referring to a claim for refund
under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-1-901 to 67-1-912. Indeed, Tenn. Code
Ann. § 67–1–1807 applies only to tax disputes by the commissioner of
revenue. Furthermore, because Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–1807 does not
control tax disputes under § 67–1–901, there is no conflict and § 67–1–
1807 cannot supersede the payment under protest requirement set forth
in § 67–1–901(a).
Additionally, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–911(b) explicitly states that
the General Assembly intended § 67–1–901 to apply to both state and
municipal taxes erroneously paid to municipalities. Although the
legislature could have included a corresponding provision within Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 67-1-1801 et seq., it declined to do so. In addition to
legislative intent, a broad reading of Tenn. Code Ann. § 67–1–1807 to

2018]

CASE COMMENTARIES

161

remove the payment under protest requirement for all taxes paid following
January 1, 1986 would impliedly repeal § 67–1–901 and § 67-1- 911, which
the court disfavored.
The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision and
overruled Vulcan Materials and other decisions inconsistent with this
opinion. Based on the court’s interpretation of the statutes, Tenn. Code
Ann. §§ 67–1–901, et. seq., applies to municipality tax disputes, and a
taxpayer must pay a disputed tax under protest to be entitled to a refund.
Because the retailers did not fulfill the payment under protest requirement,
they are not eligible for refunds to excessive tax collections.
Following this decision, practitioners should advise clients to
protest payment of disputed taxes to preserve refund eligibility. Because
parties must pay disputed municipal taxes under protest to be eligible for
a refund, practitioners must remain up-to-date on the statutory
requirements regarding municipal taxes. Parties who are unfamiliar with
the protest requirement for disputed municipal taxes will not be eligible
for reimbursement of the excessive collection. Indeed, transactional
attorneys must ensure their clients remain aware of municipal tax
standards to avoid losing money through excessive collections.
STATUTORY LIENS
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that, pursuant to Tenn. Code
Ann. § 66-21-101, attachment of the lien-subject property is the only
remedy available to a statutory lien holder who is not provided a
method of enforcement by the lien statute. Embraer Aircraft Maint.
Servs., Inc. v. AeroCentury Corp., 538 S.W.3d 404 (Tenn. 2017).
Dixon Babb
In Embraer Aircraft Maintenance Services, Inc. v. AeroCentury Corp., the
Supreme Court of Tennessee addressed: (1) whether original attachment
of lien-subject property is the only remedy available to statutory lien
holders under the “catch-all” provision contained in Tenn. Code Ann. §
66-21-101; and (2) if special circumstances exist that allow a court to attach
proceeds of the sale of lien-subject property when the property owner has
made such attachment impossible. Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101 provides
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that statutory liens lacking a prescribed method of enforcement under the
statute “may be enforced by original attachment . . . to be levied on the
property upon which the lien exists.” The Supreme Court of Tennessee
held original attachment is the only method of enforcement authorized
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101, while declining to answer the second
question on the basis that it is not a defined question of Tennessee law.
This case originated from a contract between Embraer Aircraft
Maintenance Services, Inc. (“Embraer”) and Colgan Air, Inc. (“Colgan”),
in which Embraer was to perform maintenance on a SAAB-SANIA Model
SAAB 340B aircraft (“Aircraft”). Colgan originally leased the Aircraft
from AeroCentury Corp. (“AeroCentury”). The lease required Colgan to
conduct a return inspection and perform certain maintenance services and
repairs on the Aircraft before returning it to AeroCentury at the end of
the lease term. To meet these obligations, Colgan contracted with
Embraer to perform the inspection and any necessary repairs. In January
2012, after working with representatives of both Colgan and AeroCentury,
Embraer finally completed the necessary work. Following Embraer’s
completion, a repairman’s lien “secured by the aircraft automatically arose
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-19-101 and 66-19-102.”
On January 25, 2012, Embraer sent an invoice to Colgan in the
amount of $351,465.20 for the work completed. Colgan did not pay the
invoice, and on April 1, 2012, Colgan filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Shortly after, Embraer, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-19-301,
perfected its repairmen’s lien by filing a notice with the Register of Deeds
for Davidson County and the Federal Aviation Administration. Embraer
also notified AeroCentury and Colgan of the lien.
On January 25, 2013, Embraer filed an action in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee seeking to foreclose
on the Aircraft. “Embraer asked the [d]istrict [c]ourt to direct the sale of
the Aircraft, order AeroCentury to surrender possession of the Aircraft
and its title to the new owner, and then apply the proceeds of the sale to
the debt owed by Colgan to Embraer.” In July 2013, despite the
foreclosure proceedings, AeroCentury leased the Aircraft to Private
Corporation International Joint Stock Aviation Company URGA
(“URGA”), an aviation company located in Ukraine. In conformity with

2018]

CASE COMMENTARIES

163

the lease, the Airplane was exported to Ukraine and removed from
registration in the United States.
The lease gave URGA the option to purchase the Aircraft, which
URGA exercised on March 25, 2014. The purchase agreement stated that
URGA would be receiving the Airplane free and clear of any
encumbrances, except the lien, which would be removed after closing.
AeroCentury did not notify the court or Embraer of the sale. On
November 24, 2015, Embraer filed a motion seeking summary judgment
against AeroCentury, asking the court to foreclose on the Aircraft.
AeroCentury filed a response, in which it disclosed the sale of the Airplane
to the court and Embraer. Specifically, the response stated that “any
foreclosure order from the [c]ourt . . . is of no value to Embraer, because
AeroCentury had sold the Aircraft and thus could not deliver it to the
[d]istrict [c]ourt for sale.” Following AeroCentury’s response, Embraer
asked the court to order AeroCentury to deliver the proceeds from the
sale of the Aircraft to satisfy the debt. The district court, in an effort to
resolve the confusion over remedies available under Tenn. Code Ann. §
66-19-101, asked the Supreme Court of Tennessee to determine whether
original attachment of lien-subject property is the only remedy available to
statutory lien holders. Additionally, the district court asked the supreme
court to address whether special circumstances exist that allow a court to
attach proceeds of the sale of lien-subject property when the property
owner has made such attachment impossible.
Regarding the first question, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held
that the only method of enforcement for a statutory lien holder under
Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101 is original attachment of the lien-subject
property. First, the supreme court established the validity of the automatic
mechanic’s lien pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-19-101. Because Tenn.
Code Ann. § 66-19-101 does not provide a method for enforcement, the
court turned to Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101, which addresses situation
in which a lien statute does not specify a method of enforcement.
Interpreting this statute, the court stated it must first “ascertain and . . .
give full effect to the General Assembly’s intent and purpose in drafting
Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101.” The supreme court noted that to ascertain
a statute’s true meaning, its words must be interpreted according to their
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plain meaning and in the context of the entire statute. Further, statutes
are not to be forced into a particular construction that would hinder the
statute’s true meaning. The Supreme Court of Tennessee, quoting its
previous decision in Parker-Harris Co. v. Tale, 188 S.W. 54, 56 (Tenn. 1916),
stated that “[w]hen a lien comes into existence by force of a statute, it must
be measured by the statute, and can have no greater force than the statute
gives it.”
Thus, the Supreme Court of Tennessee focused on the plain
language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101, which only addresses
attachment as a means of enforcement. Embraer conceded, and the
supreme court acknowledged, that liens established under Tenn. Code
Ann. § 66-19-101 follow the property, not the proceeds from the sale of
the property. Since Embraer did not have a § 66-19-101 lien on the
proceeds, § 66-21-101 provides no remedy for Embraer regarding the
proceeds. Further, the supreme court clarified that that use of the word
“may” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101 “indicates only that the creditor
‘may,’ or may not, choose to collect the debt by attaching the lien-subject
property,” and “may” is not indicative of a legislative intent to include
other remedies.
As to the second question, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
declined to address the merits of the question because it was more of “an
open-ended inquiry” as to methods by which Embraer may reach the
proceeds of the sale, rather than a defined question of unsettled Tennessee
law. The supreme court expressly stated that it “limits [itself] to defined
questions of Tennessee law for which ‘there is no controlling precedent in
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.’” Furthermore, there
are several other supreme court decisions that display various remedies
available to Embraer. Thus, the Supreme Court of Tennessee declined to
answer to second certified question.
In light of this decision, practitioners representing repairmen
should advise their clients to retain possession of repaired property until
they receive payment for their services. However, if the lienholder loses
possession and the lien-subject property is unreachable, the lienholder has
the option to seek alternative relief, rather than rely solely on the “catch
all” provision of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-21-101. On the other hand,
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practitioners who represent clients that are in possession of property
subject to a repairman’s lien should warn their clients that selling liensubject property does not bar the lienholder from recovery and could
result in harsher punishments.
TITLE VII & DAMAGES
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Title VII defendants
have the burden of proving that the plaintiff did not exercise due
diligence to mitigate their damages, and courts are required to
analyze case-specific factors before awarding prejudgment interests
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1961(a). Pittington v. Great Smoky Mt.
Lumberjack Feud, LLC, 880 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2018).
Mary Beth Hendershott
In Pittington v. Great Smoky Mt. Lumberjack Feud, LLC, the Sixth
Circuit addressed whether the district court abused its discretion in
denying a plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the issue of damages, when
the jury’s verdict “awarded damages in an amount substantially less than
unquestionably proved by the plaintiff’s uncontradicted and undisputed
evidence.” (quoting Anchor v. O’Toole, 94 F.3d 1014, 1021 (6th Cir. 1996)
(emphasis in original)). The court noted that back pay damages do not
have to be proven to an exact certitude by a Title VII plaintiff, and any
ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit
held further that district courts must examine several case-specific factors
before applying the statutory calculation for prejudgment interest awards
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).
This case arose out of a retaliation claim filed by David Pittington
(“Pittington”) against his former employer, Great Smoky Mountain
Lumberjack Feud, LLC (“Lumberjack”). In June 2012, Pittington began
working as a box office clerk at Lumberjack. Pittington testified that
during his employment at Lumberjack he generally worked eight or more
hours a day. Pittington also stated that he received two promotions and
one pay raise (from $8 to $10.50 per hour) during his time at Lumberjack.
However, Pittington testified that he began experiencing retaliatory action
at work for supporting his wife in her sexual harassment complaint against
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Lumberjack. Specifically, Pittington stated that he was demoted, his hours
and duties were decreased, and he was forced to work in conditions that
aggravated his previously existing disabilities.
Lumberjack ultimately fired Pittington on October 8, 2012.
Following his termination, Pittington testified that he did not find a new
job until April 2013. Pittington’s new job only paid $7.25 per hour and
he was laid off by the end of August 2013. Pittington asserts that he
worked a number of minimal paying, short-term jobs with unfavorable
conditions during the two years following his termination. During that
time, he also experienced periods of unemployment. Pittington sued
Lumberjack, alleging that Lumberjack discriminated against him because
of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), and as a retaliatory action for his wife's sexual harassment
complaint, in violation of Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act.
Pittington requested that the jury award him back-pay totaling
$40,632.50, and a prejudgment interest award calculated at 10%, the
maximum amount allowed under the Tennessee Human Rights Act.
Lumberjack argued that Pittington did not mitigate his damages
adequately and should not be entitled to the full back pay amount that he
requested. The jury returned a verdict in Pittington’s favor regarding his
Title VII and Tennessee Human Rights Act claims. The jury, however,
did not award compensatory or punitive damages. As such, Pittington
was only awarded $10,000 in back pay. Pittington did not agree with the
jury’s findings and filed a motion with the district court, asking the court
to increase the jury’s damages award under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). Pittington also asked the district court for an award of
front pay and prejudgment interest at a rate of 10%. The district court
denied Pittington’s request for front pay, increased back pay, and a new
trial as to damages. The district court judge did, however, agree that
Pittington was entitled to prejudgment interest. The court calculated the
prejudgment interest according to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) in the amount of
0.66%, stating that the requested 10% would result in an “undue windfall”
for Pittington. Pittington filed a motion for a new trial on the issue of
damages, a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and appealed the
district court judge’s decision to calculate the prejudgment interest award
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in accordance to 28 U.S.C. §1961(a) instead of the Tennessee Human
Rights Act.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that no
reasonable jury could have found Pittington’s recovery of back pay to be
$10,000, and the district court abused its discretion by denying Pittington’s
motion for a new trial on the issue of damages. The court’s decision was
based primarily on its prior holding in Rasimas v. Michigan Dep’t of Mental
Health, 714 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1983). In Rasimas, the court established that
a successful Title VII plaintiff is entitled to back pay in an amount to make
them whole for the wrong they suffered. Additionally, a Title VII plaintiff
does not need to prove an exact amount of back pay, and any ambiguities
should be decided against the wrongdoer. Lastly, Rasimas established that
Title VII defendants have the burden of proving that the plaintiff did not
exercise due diligence to mitigate their damages.
Analyzing Pittington’s case under these principles, the court determined
that the district court erred by attributing the jury’s limited back pay award
to Pittington’s failure to mitigate his damages. Instead, Lumberjack
carried the burden of proving that Pittington did not exercise due
diligence to mitigate his damages, which can only be satisfied by showing:
1) availability of substantially equivalent positions; and 2) Pittington did
not diligently seek these positions. Lumberjack did not provide any
evidence of substantially similar employment opportunities available to
Pittington in Pigeon Forge, nor any evidence proving that Pittington’s job
search efforts were unreasonable. The jury’s verdict cannot be based on
an inference of these two conditions. Since Lumberjack omitted proof of
Pittington’s failure to mitigate his damages, the jury’s award of $10,000 is
not based upon the indisputable evidence. Additionally, an award of 30–
50% of what Pittington was actually due does not fall within the
acceptable range of back-pay amounts supported by the evidence.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court judge’s award
of prejudgment interest at 0.66% pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). Under
Schumacher v. AK Steel Corp. Ret. Accumulation Pension Plan, 711 F.3d 675,
687 (6th Cir. 2013), district courts are required to analyze case-specific
factors before awarding prejudgment interests in accordance with 28
U.S.C. §1961(a), including “the remedial goal to place the plaintiff in the
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position that he or she would have occupied prior to the wrongdoing; the
prevention of unjust enrichment on behalf of the wrongdoer; the lost
interest value of money wrongly withheld; and the rate of inflation.” The
court found that the district court’s judgment only mentioned one or two
of these factors in passing but did not make any efforts to explain or
compare rates of interests with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §1961(a).
Without this case-specific analysis, the Sixth Circuit ultimately held that
the district court abused its discretion to award prejudgment interest in
accordance with the calculation framework of 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).
The Court of Appeals accordingly reversed the district court’s
denial of Pittington’s motion for a new trial on the issue of damages, since
the district court applied the wrong legal standard in holding that
Pittington carried the burden of proving he mitigated his damages. The
court also reversed the district court’s decision on the calculation of
prejudgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) because case-specific
factors were not analyzed.
In light of this decision, practitioners should present district
courts with a formula to calculate prejudgment interest awards in
accordance with the Schumacher factors listed above, to ensure that their
client will receive equitable prejudgment interest awards. This calculation
should not create an unjust windfall for either party, but should focus on
satisfying the remedial goals of Title VII and avoid unjustly enriching the
wrongdoer. On the other hand, counsel for defendants must carry their
burden of proving the unreasonableness of plaintiff’s mitigation efforts
by the preponderance of the evidence, and not rely on the evidence
introduced by the plaintiff or upon the inferences of a friendly jury to
obtain the desired verdict.
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WILLS & ESTATES
Under Tennessee law, a beneficiary who had a confidential
relationship with the decedent may rebut the presumption of undue
influence by showing that the decedent was
of sound mind and acted independently when devising the estate.
Frank v. Fields, No. E2016-00809-COA-R3-CV, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS
360 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017).
Phil Reed
In Frank v. Fields, No. E2016-00809-COA-R3-CV, 2017 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 360 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017), the Tennessee Court of
Appeals addressed how an attorney-in-fact may rebut the presumption of
undue influence arising out of a confidential relationship with a decedent
who changed his bank accounts to be payable-on-death to the attorneyin-fact. The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that, although a
presumption of undue influence arises when a beneficiary is granted
power of attorney, that presumption is rebutted when the power of
attorney is not used to benefit the attorney-in-fact, the decedent is of
sound mind, and the decedent receives independent legal advice.
In January 2012, Ray L. Frank (“Decedent”) died at the age of
ninety-five without issue or a surviving spouse. Several years before his
death, Decedent designated his nephew, Ronnie Fields (“Mr. Fields”), as
his attorney-in-fact and beneficiary of several checking and certificate of
deposit accounts that were payable upon the death of the Decedent. Upon
Decedent’s death, Mr. Fields withdrew $458,881.87 in checks made out to
himself, leaving a total estate of $102,000.00 to be distributed according
to Decedent’s will. Three of the four remaining nieces and nephews in
Decedent’s will (“Plaintiffs”) brought an action against Mr. Fields, alleging
that Mr. Fields exercised undue influence through his confidential
relationship with Decedent, and requesting that the trial court order Mr.
Fields to reimburse Decedent’s estate for the money he had withdrawn.
At the trial court, all parties agreed that Mr. Fields and Decedent
had a close relationship in the years prior to his death. In 2004, Decedent
began losing his vision and Mr. Fields would eat lunch with him several
times a week. Mr. Fields also transported Decedent to appointments and
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“anywhere he wanted to go.” In October 2005 and December 2010,
Decedent executed two powers of attorney naming Mr. Fields as his
attorney-in-fact. However, Mr. Fields did not exercise the power of
attorney to change the payable on death status or ownership of any of
Decedent’s accounts. John M. Carson, Decedent’s attorney, testified at
trial that while preparing Decedent’s will, he specifically reminded
Decedent of certain assets that would pass outside his estate, including
payable on death accounts. He further testified that, while Decedent was
completely blind at the time of executing this last document, “his mind
remained sharp.”
The trial court ruled, and all parties agreed, that Mr. Fields and
Decedent had established a confidential relationship. “Under Tennessee
law, as in most jurisdictions, a presumption of undue influence arises
where the dominant party in a confidential relationship receives a benefit
from the other party.” In re Estate of Hamilton, 67 S.W.3d 786, 793 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2001). To overcome this presumption, the dominant party must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction at issue was
fair. Relying on testimony from Mr. Carson, several bank employees who
oversaw the accounts at issue, and the parties, all of whom described
Decedent as of sound mind, the trial court found that Mr. Fields had
successfully rebutted the presumption of undue influence.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals noted that “[i]t is rare
to find direct evidence of undue influence.” In seeking to prove undue
influence, one usually must instead prove “suspicious circumstances” that
give rise to a conclusion that the person being influenced did not act freely
and independently. The court, referencing their previous decision in In re
Estate of Maddox, 60 S.W.3d 84, 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), provided that
the most frequently relied-upon suspicious circumstances are: “1) the
existence of a confidential relationship between the testator and the
beneficiary; 2) the testator's physical or mental deterioration; and 3) the
beneficiary's active involvement in procuring the will.”
The court also applied In re Estate of Davis, No. E2015-00826COA-R3-CV, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 185, 2016 WL 944143 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Mar. 14, 2016), a similar decision, in finding that Mr. Fields had
rebutted the presumption of undue influence. In that case, the Tennessee
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Court of Appeals upheld a decision where the decedent, who had filed for
a divorce from his wife but died before it was finalized, attempted to
disinherit his wife and daughters. The court specifically noted that
whether a testator’s decisions in their will are fair is not a relevant
consideration when determining whether the testator was of sound mind
and not subject to undue influence.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment,
emphasizing that all testimony, including Plaintiffs’, pointed to Decedent
being of sound mind when designating his accounts as payable on death
to Mr. Fields. The court determined that the close relationship Mr. Fields
shared with Decedent was convincing evidence that Decedent may have
felt Mr. Fields deserved such a considerable share of his assets. Finally,
the independent legal advice that Mr. Carson provided Decedent regarding
the payable on death accounts showed the court that Decedent was aware
of the accounts being excluded from the will.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals here focused on the sound mind
of the Decedent when making the decision to split the remaining shares
of his real and personal property. Going forward, Tennessee attorneys
need to be aware that a court is less concerned with the fairness of the
decisions in a Decedent’s will, declining physical health, or advanced age
when determining if the decedent was subject to undue influence. Thus,
attorneys may wish to take note of their client’s mental health while
preparing a will and ensure that their client fully understands the technical
aspects of their decision. By doing so, attorneys can protect their client’s
true wishes after death.

